


## NATO became the flash point for Russia & Ukraine

Russia watched with mounting resentment as the transatlantic alliance has nearly doubled its membership since the end of the Cold War – *More Russian border threats likely* 



NATO's Post-Cold War expansion – 15 new members since the end of the Cold War



#### **NATO**

Post-Cold War expansion

1990 Germany\*

1999 Czech Republic Hungary Poland

2004 Bulgaria

Estonia

Latvia

Lithuania

Romania

Slovakia

Slovenia

2009 Albania

Croatia

2017 Montenegro

2020 North Macedonia

Source: Statista/Council on Foreign Relations Feb 2022


Six Minute Strategy - March 2022

# 1: Energy - Russia supplies 40-50% of European gas and 25% of oil imports



## European reliance on Russian gas has been rising


### **EU - Share of natural gas imports from Russia**



Source: Macrobond, 03.03.22

## Dependence on Russian gas in Europe is very high

#### 1. Germany and Italy import almost half their gas from Russia



Source: EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. Note: Latest available data, 2019 or 2020.

"If the EU is forced or willing to bear the cost, it should be possible to replace Russian gas already for next winter without economic activity being devastated, people freezing, or electricity supply being disrupted. But on the ground, dozens of regulations will have to be revised...a lot of money quickly spent and hard decisions taken."

Bruegel Feb 2022

Source: Macrobond/Bruegel Brussels 2022




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# 2. Trade: Russia as a share of global GDP is less than 2% - main transmission channel to global economy will be energy

## Russia: Top trade partners

12-months rolling sum



Source: Macrobond

## 3: Ukraine crisis is adding to global inflation fears

Base effects still mean pricing pressures ease over time




## **Key Russian commodity prices soar**




## Food prices may exceed 2011 high – risking a global crisis

# Russian Key Export Commodity Prices (Rebased end 2019)



**FAO, Global Food Price Index** 



Source: Macrobond, 03.03.22

Food prices now close to 2011 levels which contributed to political uprisings in Libya and Egypt

# 4. Russia: Sanctions, SWIFT exclusion, and frozen central bank reserves may trigger domestic economic collapse



CBR increases policy rates to 20% to defend currency


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
Russian Central bank reserves (50-70% likely frozen)

## Russia Currency & Equities



Source: Macrobond, 03.03.22





Source: Macrobond, 03.03.22

# No recession risk yet but pace of global growth already slowing

IMF forecasts global growth to moderate to 4.4% in 2022




**World Composite PMI suggests growth was slowing** 



**Several PMI readings are already < 50 indicating contraction** 


### **World Composite PMI (IHS)**



Source: Macrobond, 03.03.22

### **Recent weakening**

Survey-based measures of activity for some of the world's largest economies are indicating weaker momentum. (composite purchasing managers' indexes, seasonally adjusted, index > 50=expansion)



Sources: Haver Analytics and IMF staff calculations. Note: Reading of 50 signals no change from prior month. Readings above 50 indicate improvement, lower readings signal deterioration. ESP is a permanent invitee.





Six Minute Strategy - March 2022

# Equity markets are typically resilient at the start of armed conflict



Chart 1: Performance of the US equity market in the six months following a major conflict

### **S&P500:** Equity performance during recent conflicts





Source: Macrobond, 03.03.22

# **Ukraine Invasion: Initial Policy Implications**





## **Ukraine Invasion – Policy implications March 2022**

Economic	<ul> <li>Inflation higher for longer - no global recession yet</li> <li>Inflation already at 40 year high – Average oil price 2022 of U\$110 means US inflation peaks close to 8%</li> <li>Interest rates 2022: 4-5 rate rises US, 3 in UK, none in Euro</li> <li>QT 2022: BOE begins Q2 2022, Fed Q3 and ECB stops bond purchases Q3</li> </ul>
Geopolitical	<ul> <li>Risk of escalation high</li> <li>Terrible destruction of Ukrainian cities follows experience in Chechnya and Syria</li> <li>Poland, Hungary &amp; 5 further NATO countries share border with Russia/Ukraine/Belarus – Risk of border clash high</li> <li>Outside possibility of peace talks - may be sponsored by China</li> </ul>
Trade	<ul> <li>Deep Russian recession – global trade fragments</li> <li>Russian economy risks recession or possible financial collapse from sanctions/trade restrictions</li> <li>International banks, industry and consumers reluctant to trade/use Russian assets - moral &amp; sanctions risks</li> <li>Further partitioning of technology/internet between West, China &amp; Russia</li> </ul>
Asset Allocation Implications	<ul> <li>Neutral equites</li> <li>Equities neutral – quality, thematic preference with dividend yield where appropriate</li> <li>Strong UW bonds and credit – caution EM – zero direct exposure Russia</li> <li>OW Cash - portfolio insurance where appropriate – neutral currencies</li> <li>OW Alternatives – gold, renewables, infrastructure</li> </ul>
Risks	Energy: Russia ceases European gas exports  Military: NATO dragged into border war – Further nuclear warnings  Recession: Collapse in European consumer and business confidence on drawn out conflict  Inflation: Higher for longer as energy centric shock spreads (esp. food) - Triggers wage response

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