

# Six Minute Strategy

## What does tighter money mean for markets?

18 February 2022



# An extraordinary global recovery - at the cost of higher inflation


Inflation higher for longer: Base effects, supply bottlenecks and Omicron/labour costs



Most major economies at or above pre-COVID GDP levels

## GDP in selected countries

Indices: 2019 Q4=100 (the start of COVID)




Source: Macrobond, 17.02.22



Consumer price inflation (yoy)

## Global Inflation Rates



Source: Macrobond, 17.02.22

# As inflation risks rise, central bankers are dialling back crisis-era policies

## 1. Inflation: *broad based pressures*

- Average US inflation of 4.5-5% expected for 2022 - upside risk everywhere ex-Japan
- US headline CPI to trend at 2.7% from 2023 onwards


## 2. Monetary policy: *normalisation begins*

- **QE:** To fall significantly from \$2.9tr in 2021, to \$470bn in 2022 & then *negative \$ 1.1 trillion (QT) in 2023*
- **QT:** Start in the US and UK in H1 2022
- **Interest rates 2022:** 5 increases in the US, 2 in the UK, unchanged in Euro area & Japan, China to cut



## Inflation will not return to post Financial-Crisis levels

US Inflation Across Business Cycles and Sarasin Projections



Source: Macrobond, 17.02.22

# Interest rate rises will likely be faster & balance sheet run-off (QT) sooner than in previous cycles




Expect 5 hikes in 2022 and terminal rates to reach 2.25%




Balance sheet run-off in July 2022 & terminal size \$7tr

Path of policy normalisation in the US



Source: Macrobond, 17.02.22

Quantitative Tightening of US Fed Reserve Balance Sheet



Source: Macrobond, 17.02.22

***Why do central banks need to reduce balance sheets? (1) Artificially low bond yields distort asset markets risking bubbles (2) Record balance sheets today reduce flexibility in the next crisis (3) The potential to muddy fiscal & monetary policy***




# Risk 1: Rising bond yields

Bond yields *could* rise sharply if policy continues to normalise

 Today's positioning of bond yields and core inflation is in 'unknown territory'

## US: 10-year yields vs core CPI inflation

U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), U.S. Department of Treasury 1990 to date



Source: Macrobond, 17.02.22


# Risk 2: Excessive valuations

As policy rates normalise COVID-led PE multiple expansion is already starting to reverse

 Global valuations are vulnerable as policy normalises

 Profit margins are already at record levels

Equity Indices 1 year forward PE (Factset)



Net Margins for World Equities (FactSet)




Source: Macrobond, 17.02.22

### 3. Ukraine: a prolonged stand-off risks higher energy prices for longer

Russian leaders have watched with mounting resentment as NATO has nearly doubled its membership since the end of the Cold War.

 Markets are vulnerable to Russian aggression given tightness of gas and oil markets

#### NATO's Expanding Membership



#### NATO

##### ● Post-Cold War expansion

1990 Germany\*

1999 Czech Republic  
Hungary  
Poland

2004 Bulgaria  
Estonia  
Latvia  
Lithuania  
Romania  
Slovakia  
Slovenia

2009 Albania  
Croatia

2017 Montenegro

2020 North Macedonia

Source: Council on Foreign Relations, January 2021

# Outlook: As central banks pivot to fight inflation the outlook for risk assets becomes more challenging



Global strategy update – February 2022

<b>Bonds</b>	<b>Strong underweight</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Strong UW government bonds – global inflationary pressures remain elevated</li><li>• UW investment grade credit – yield spreads too narrow – UK charity &amp; infrastructure issues offer social impact benefits</li></ul>
<b>Equities</b>	<b>Neutral</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Global neutral – earnings remain robust but central bank liquidity support fading</li><li>• UK neutral - dividend support and valuation attractive – M&amp;A likely</li><li>• EM neutral - policy tightening and virus risks still acute – political risk on the rise</li></ul>
<b>Alternatives</b>	<b>Strong Overweight</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• OW other alternatives– infrastructure and renewables beneficiaries of fiscal spend – liquidity issues remain</li><li>• OW uncorrelated alternatives – gold positions as hedge against central bank policy error</li></ul>
<b>Cash</b>	<b>Strong Overweight</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• No currency preference</li><li>• Consider portfolio insurance</li></ul>
<b>Risks</b>	<b>Current:</b> Valuations stretched, bond market risk as policy tightens, inflation becomes entrenched in labour market <b>Longer-term:</b> Central bank policy error, China/Taiwan & Russia/Ukraine tensions, real bond yields normalise aggressively, climate transition risks



# Important information

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